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The myth of Europa revisited (after the Euro crisis)

When Greece adopted the euro, in 2001, to replace the old drachma, it chose, for its €2 coins, a unique  and rather funny design: the abduction of Europa by Zeus, disguised as a white bull.

Ironically, though many contemporary Greeks might struggle to see the irony, Europa was a woman of high lineage. Zeus, the story goes, abducted her so that he could ravish her later. And ravish her he did. The irony in it being that, in fact, that’s just what Greece seems to have done to the Euro.

 

As the final day of the relationship could soon come to pass, perhaps a new design, based on an updated version of the myth, might be adopted for the new Greek coins, whatever they be. Below is a rather infantile interpretation of the myth of Europa after the crisis of he euro. To the attention of the Greek Treasury.

 

awkward partners?

The French-UK defence treaty may show a new way for European countries to integrate despite, and, at the same time, because of the unusual circumstances, settings and parties involved.

While it is true that the France-UK treaties my be a British attempt to slow down the already sluggish ESDP, it seems more likely that financial circumstances have plaid a major role in determining the new entente. The agreements may yet, in the long term, develop to involve other European countries, especially if the economic crisis outlives its exceptional and becomes a permanent feature of the post-Lisbon European scene; or they may stall military integration further.

Traditionally, European integration has proceeded by hiccups, with many impasses during prolonged periods of economic stagnation, followed by sudden integration bursts, driven by the Franco-German engine. The defence treaties between France and the UK have instead been signed during a deep economic crisis, and, despite the British historical awkwardness towards Europe, the UK has been, for once, a pace setter rather than a reluctant follower signing a cooperation treaty in a rather sensitive policy area, and with its European archenemy, France no less

While the treaty is strictly non-EU related, an obvious question comes to mind: has hell frozen over?

leftover (wiki)leak soup

The news of the latest Wikileaks war logs release would hardly have come as a surprise to the sensible and critical reader, for such stories have appeared in the media for quite some time now. While the extent of such activities might have been uncertain, one could have easily imagined, at each new revelation, that only the proverbial tip of the iceberg was being exposed. After all, history teaches us that victorious armies have been allowed to loot an pillage at will, with, at best, the silent consent of the authorities, and sometimes with their express directive.
Of course, in Iraq and Afghanistan western governments have sent their troops to fight under the normative banner of democracy promotion and human rights protection, and therefore an appearance of respectability is essential to maintaining the moral high ground.
And so one may be forgiven for feeling that the claim that each disclosure puts the lives of civilians and soldiers at risk is patronizing and a little insulting, for such a claim assumes that the people of Iraq knew nothing of torture and unjust imprisonment before the leaks, when in fact they had first hand experience of it. Whether they have reason or not to hate the west, should we really believe that they have not been doing so well before the war log leaks?
Furthermore, attempts to gag such news because of security concerns for soldiers and civilians are an implicit admission of double standards when valuing lives. Never mind fairness for those people then, but at least let us get off our high horses and call things by their names, for in war, Lady Justice has taken off the blindfold and can see very well.

… and a European army and foreign policy.

The latest call for the creation of a European Army will fuel Euro-sceptics’ fears that the Lisbon Treaty will erode further national sovereignty and bring us closer to the creation of a United States of Europe. Defense and security policies certainly define the unity of the state, and its authority over the national territory and the people (demos) therein. Opponents of the Lisbon Treaty will thus base their argument on legitimacy issues. While I remain unconvinced that the Treaty does, in fact, strengthen the diplomatic and/or military roles of the EU, I would normatively argue against such development.

The acquisition of state-like features would be bad deal for the EU more than it would be for its members. While it is easy to agree with realists that the nation-state is (still) the main agent in international relations, it is undeniable that the EU has developed its own brand of actorness, through policies other than classical foreign and security ones. But while nation-states’ international agency is based on ethnic values, the EU’s must based on civic ones, given the lack of a European demos. The EU’s international actorness (whether we call it civilian or normative) is based on its domestic political experience, where integration has brought about a novel mode of governance, based on cooperation among states, either for the pursuit of common interests, as regime theorists would have it, or because cooperation is good as such, as a liberal of the Rawlsian tradition might argue.

While I do not necessarily subscribe to the realist view that states prioritize interests over values in their international agency, acting normatively only when their interests are not at stake, I am also not naive enough to believe that the EU’s actorness reflects a norm-based agency all the time. The Union is, after all, made up of nation-states, and as such it shows the contradictions of conflicting identities, civic and ethnocentric ones. Acquiring an effective common foreign and defense policy – a task that has so far been underlined by multiple failures – might shift the balance of the EU’s international agency towards exclusive practices. Whether the EU, and its members, are capable of creating a foreign policy, which mirrors inclusive identities, based on citizenship rather than nationality, remains to be seen.

A European president?

With the Lisbon Treaty entry into force now in sight, rumors have been circulating as to who will be the first EU President, an office tenable for two and half years and renewable once, but that nobody seems to understand what it is for. The UK, being the Euro-enthusiast member we know, has been ripe with rumors about Tony Blair’s presumed candidacy for the post. Analysis has mixed with gossip: why would he not run openly? Why does the public, if we are to believe the British media, seem to dislike him so much? Would he be the best candidate for the job, given his political legacy, not to mention the European credentials of the UK as a whole?

As usual, however, the debate has been hijacked by domestic issues, shunning from European ones. What is the European President supposed to do? It may come as a surprise to most tabloid readers, but the idea of a European president is not entirely new. Each one of the 27 members holds the presidency of the Council for six months, with the relevant national minister chairing meetings with his/her European counterparts.

Granted, the ‘new’ President, under Lisbon, would be a full time chair. Short of surprising, and unprecedented agreements between the 27 in matters of foreign and defence policies, where intergovernmentalism and unanimity apply, the newly established President would not be much more than a coordinator, and agenda setter, with the appointed task to define the Union’s political directions and priorities.

Much ado about nothing?